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Abstract 
 
The existence of a universal minimum wage has been, and continues to be, an intensely debated 
issue. On the one hand, the controversy surrounding minimum wage appears to be partly 
justified because the effects of the introduction and increase of minimum wage may differ 
greatly depending on the labour market structure. On the other, the current academic literature 
on the subject do not provide clear evidence of which collectives are likely to be more affected 
in terms of employment by the introduction or increase of minimum wage. Using the data for 
the period 2000-2008, this study aims to examine the effect of minimum wage on the youth 
employment in Spain, taking into account both the existing regional differences and the 
dynamic behaviour of employment. Unlike other previous academic works on this subject, we 
are also going to consider the effect of seasonality on employment, a particularly wide-spread 
feature of youth employment in Spain. The results obtained in our analysis do not provide clear 
evidence about any negative effect of minimum wage on youth employment during the period 
under study. While this result may point out to the existence of a monopsonistic structure of the 
labour market, the coexistence of increases both in minimum wage and in youth employment 
rate during this period could also be explained in the light of a perfect competitive labour 
market with a high degree of dynamism and a structural change in employment demand. 
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1. Introduction. 
 
 Today over hundred countries from across the globe have ratified the 
International Labour Organisation’s Minimum Wage Fixing Convention, 1970 (No. 
131)2 for the introduction of appropriate legislation and administrative regulations 
regarding minimum wage. As signatories of this convention, these countries now 
provide universal minimum wage coverage, with only few of them applying certain 
restrictions on this respect3. 
 
 The existence of minimum wage providing universal coverage has been a widely 
contested issue. On the one hand, those who advocate for its introduction or 
maintenance argue that a minimum wage established by law provides a basic guarantee 
for self-sufficiency, that is to say, a sufficient income for full-time workers to acquire 
essential goods and services. Likewise, the existence of a minimum wage, it is argued, 
prevents those employers who hold a dominant market position to take advantage of 
certain type of employees like women, low-qualification workers, long-term 
unemployed, and individuals with little or no working experience, etc. 
 
 On the other hand, those who oppose the existence of a minimum wage, or its 
maintenance at the current high levels, for its presumed negative effects have advanced 
several arguments for its dismissal. They argue, for example, that a minimum wage is 
not a suitable instrument to fight poverty since there are other more effective and 
efficient fiscal alternatives. For them, the existence of a minimum wage discourage 
employers from hiring persons covered by the current legislative and, therefore, affects 
                                                 
2 International Labour Organisation (ILO) (2008). 
3 Among the countries which do not include certain workers’ collectives in their respective minimum 
wage legislation we can mention the following examples: agricultural workers in Canada; agricultural 
workers, domestic services workers and public servants in Austria; workers who are relatives to the 
owner or legal representative of the business in Ireland; apprentices and domestic workers in Holland, 
workers who are not covered by collective bargain agreements in Switzerland, workers who are family 
members of the owner or legal representatives of the business, fishermen and members of the professional 
armed forces in UK; retail, health and education workers and individuals employed by public agencies in 
the USA. 
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negatively on the overall employment rate of certain collectives, especially women and 
young people. In addition to this, they also like to point out to other presumed negative 
effects which minimum wage might have like. For example, on the competitive position 
of businesses and companies, the compensatory replacement between workers, the 
increase of the differences between the so-called insiders and outsiders, or the indirect 
stimulus it provides for the growth of an informal economy. 
 
 To some extent, this controversy appears to be justified because the effects 
which result from the introduction or increase of minimum wage differ from one 
country to another, depending both on the content and application of the approved 
legislation and the particular structure of the labour market. In a perfect competitive 
labour market, the introduction of a minimum wage would tend to reduce 
unemployment. But, in a monopsony structure of the labour market, the effect might 
well be the opposite. 
 
 These conflicting assessments on the effects of minimum wage are clearly 
revealed in many of the empirical studies devoted to the subject. Most pioneering works 
were primarily focused on the economy of the United States and based on a competitive 
structure of the labour market. They concluded that the existence of minimum wage had 
a negative effect on youth employment (Hashimoto and Mincer, 1970; Welch, 1974; 
Hamermesh 1981; Brown et al., 1982; Wellington, 1991; Neumark and Wascher, 1992; 
Deere et al., 1995; Currie and Fallick, 1996; Partridge and Partridge, 1998; Williams 
and Mills, 1998; Baker et al., 1999; Pereira, 2003; Yuen, 2003; Neumark et al., 2004). 
Assuming the existence of a monopsony structure, other studies have provided, in 
contrast, evidence for the neutral, or even positive, effects of minimum wage on youth 
employment (Card and Krueger, 1995; Manning and Machin, 1996; Dickens et al., 
1998, 1999; Bhaskar, 1999; Lang and Kahn, 1999). Other works based on the current 
efficiency wage literature have also reached similar conclusions in this respect (Rebitzer 
and Taylor, 1995). 
 
  Using the panel data for the period 2000-2008, this study analyses the impact of 
minimum wage on youth employment in Spain, taking into account both the existing 
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regional differences and the dynamic behaviour of employment. We also include in our 
analysis labour seasonality, a relatively widespread feature of youth employment in 
Spain. The results obtained do not provide sufficient evidence of any negative effect of 
minimum wage on youth employment in Spain over the period under study. While this 
result may appear to indicate the existence of a monopsony structure in the labour 
market, the coexistence of an increase in both minimum wage and youth employment 
during this period could also be explained in the light of a perfect competitive labour 
market with a strong dynamism and a structural change in labour demand. 
 
 The paper is organized as follows: the next section will provide a summary 
review of the recent literature on the subject. In section 3 we introduce the theoretical 
framework for the development of the empirical analysis. Section 4 offers a description 
of the data and the main variables employed in our analysis. In Section 5, we present the 
results obtained of our analysis, while Section 6 examines the possible effects of an 
increase of the minimum wage on different proposed scenarios. The main conclusions 
are offered in Section 7.  
 
 
2. Empirical Evidence 
 
 In general terms, the results obtained by the analytical works carried out for the 
last few decades in developed countries to measure the impact of minimum wage on the 
aggregated employment and unemployment tend to show negative elasticities in the 
estimated employment functions4. This appears to be particularly the case when the 
minimum wage has been significantly increased or it has been initially established at a 
relatively high level. In addition to this, as we move forward in time from the 
introduction of this measure, the negative value of the elasticity grows in absolute 
terms, a fact which appears to indicate –as it happened before with the case of labour 
demand relative to wage- the existence of lags on its influence, that is to say, of 
accumulated effects.  
                                                 
4 C. Brow, C. Gilroy and A. Cohen (1982) review the academic research on the subject up the 1980s. For 
other, more recent academic works see OCDE (1994). 
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  The importance of the effect on employment clearly differs based on the weight 
of minimum wage in relation to the average market wage. Evidence shows that if the 
minimum wage is high, the effects are negative, while if it is low, the effects are not 
significant (Katz and Krueger, 1992). From another point of view, for adult workers 
whose previous market wages were below the new minimum wage, the introduction of 
minimum wage has negative consequences on their employment as the unemployment 
rate grows among them over time, as it is demonstrated on a series of studies carried out 
in different countries (Linneman, 1980) 
 
 In the pioneering works on this subject, which were primarily focused on the 
low-wage productive sector (agriculture, retail trade, personal services, and certain 
manufacturing activities), the estimates show a 1 percent fall on employment levels for 
a 10 percent minimum wage increase (Brown et al., 1982). According to more recent 
estimates, the unemployment effects are concentrated on those individuals whose wages 
are further below from established minimum wage as well as those whose wages are 
just below the minimum wage, with elasticity values clearly significant, not only for the 
youth but also for adults who occupy the lower positions of the wage scale (Neumark et 
al., 2004). This reported evidence primarily applies to wage adjustment, working hours, 
employment and income distribution derived from minimum wage increases.  
 
 For Spain, the results do not differ greatly from the evidence obtained in other 
developed countries. The most relevant result at domestic level is that employment 
among younger people responds in a negative and significant way to changes on 
minimum wages (Pérez Domínguez, 1995; Dolado et al., 1996, Dolado y Felgueroso, 
1997; González y Güemes, 1997; Dolado et al., 1999; Peréz Domíguez et al., 2002). 
However, this result does not appear to be so conclusive when we adjust the differential 
effect of minimum wage for the different regions. In this respect, although minimum 
wage legislation provides universal coverage in Spain, there are enough regional 
differences in the social and labour structures to make possible the existence of a 
different effects on minimum wage on youth employment in each of them. Following 
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this premise, González Güemes et al. (2003) have found evidence that the elasticity of 
youth employment to changes in minimum wages differs greatly in each region.  
 
 Other contributions in the case of Spain have found that minimum wage has 
simultaneous effects on employment, labour participation, and unemployment rate of 
the younger sections of the population, pointing out to the existence of a series of 
negative effects which tend reinforce the unemployment among this age group (Pérez 
Domínguez et al, 2002). 
 
 Apart from these regional differences and their significance when examining the 
impact of minimum wage on youth employment, more recent works on the subject have 
indicated the existence of a dynamic behaviour of employment as a response to changes 
in minimum wage (Neumark and Washer, 1992; Baker et al., 1999). The work of 
González Güelmes et al. (2003) have provided important evidence concerning of these 
dynamic effects in the Spanish economy. 
 
 
3. Theoretical Framework and Econometric models. 
 
 The relevance of the effect of minimum wage on employment clearly varies 
according the weight of the minimum wage relative to the average wage. As previous 
works have shown, the impact of minimum wage will be greater on a given wage 
distribution, the closer it is to the average wage. Evidence shows that when it is high, its 
impact is negative, while if it is low, the consequences of its introduction are 
negligible5. For this reason, the most common approach for examining the effects of the 
introduction and increase of minimum wage on employment on a territorial basis is to 
use the Kaitz Index (KI) which is defined as the ratio of the minimum wage to the 
average wage. An important reason for employing this index is that it makes possible to 
collect the non-observable labour supply and demand factors, because its denominator –
the average wage- can be affected either by supply or demand shocks. 
 
                                                 
5 L. F. Katz and A. B. Krueger (1992) 
 6
 As most academic works in the subject made clear, young people between 16 
and 19 years of age usually have the lowest wages and, as a result, tend to be one of the 
most examined collectives in the empirical works aimed to study the impact of 
minimum wage on employment. The following equation of youth employment is 
commonly used as the starting point for any theoretical framework aimed to analyse the 
impact of minimum wage on employment.  
 
( ,it it ite f KI X= )          (0) 
 
where the sub-indexes i and t represent, respectively, the region and period under study; 
e the youth employment rate; KI the Kaitz index; and X captures a number of variables 
which affect both labour supply and demand. 
 
 It is important to note that, although the minimum wage in Spain is established 
at national level, there are reasons to think that this may be different for each 
autonomous regions (Comunidades Autónomas, henceforth CCAA). For example, as 
previous studies have pointed out (González Güemes et al., 2003) ,the number of 
effective hours worked may show certain variations between each region as well as over 
time. If that is the case, a Kaitz Index conceived as a simple quotient of the minimum 
wage and the average wage will not capture these differences. For this reason, the KI 
employed here has been elaborated as the ratio of the minimum wage per worked hour 
for full-time workers in a region to the average wage per worked hour in that particular 
region:  
 
min medKI W W=                                                                                                         (1) 
 
where  is the minimum wage per worked hour for full time workers and  the 
average wage per worked hour. 
minW medW
 
 Furthermore, if there are differences in the sectoral distribution of youth 
employment by regions, the KI defined in equation (1) ill not capture these differences. 
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To prevent the results to be biased due to these differences, we have accordingly 
proposed this alternative formulation, where KI is expressed in the following way:  
 
( )(1 mini t med i
i
KI O O W W=∑ )_        (2) 
 
where  represents the persons employed in sector i,  the total number of employed 
persons in the economy, and  the average wage per worked hour in the sector i
iO tO
_med iW
6. 
This new formulation allows us to take into account both the economic weight of 
different sectors in each region and the wage differences between sectors. 
 
 Using both definitions of KI, we proceed to estimate a first block of static 
models and, then, another second block to capture a specific quarterly dynamic. In both 
blocks, we begin with the estimation of a basic model although, as pointed out in other 
works (Neumark and Wascher, 1992, 1994; Baker et al., 1999; González Güemes et al, 
2003), we need to incorporate lags to the KI because the response of employment to 
variations of minimum wage may take some time to become noticeable. It is important 
to incorporate this dynamic because, as we will see below, youth employment can 
respond in a positive way to current changes in minimum wage but such effect may 
later on become neutral or even negative. Finally, the models we have estimated 
incorporate dichotomic quarterly variables because we find a significant seasonal factor 
on youth employment7. 
 
A. Static Models. 
I. Basic 
 ;  : CCAA; : Periodit it it i it ity KI X iid i tα γ β η ε ε= + + + + ?                 (3) 
 
II. With lags in Kaitz Index 
4
1
 ;  : CCAA; : Periodit it s it s it i it it
s
y KI KI X iid i tα γ δ β η ε ε−
=
= + + + + +∑ ?      (4) 
                                                 
6 The sub-index i includes three sectors: industry, construction and services. 
7 We have also tested the non-quarterly employment rate as a dependent variable. The results are similar 
to those obtained with quarterly dichotomic variables.  
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 III. With lags in Kaitz Index and quarterly dummies 
4
1
 ;  
: CCAA; : Period; : Quarter
it it s it s it i s it it
s
y KI KI X iid
i t s
α γ δ β η ϖ ε ε−
=
= + + + + + +∑ ?  (5) 
 
B. Dynamic Models 
I. Basic 
1
   : CCAA; : Period
  
it it it i it
it it it it
y KI X i t
iid
α γ β η ε
ε ρε ν ν−
= + + + +
= + ?           (6) 
 
II. With lags in Kaitz Index 
4
1
1
 ;  : CCAA; : Period
  
it it s it s it i it it
s
it it it it
y KI IK X iid i t
iid
α γ δ β η ε ε
ε ρε ν ν
−
=
−
= + + + + +
= +
∑ ?
?
 (7) 
 
III. With lags in Kaitz Index and quarterly dummies 
4
1
1
 ;  
: CCAA; : Period; : Quarter
  
it it s it s it i s it it
s
it it it it
y KI KI X iid
i t s
iid
α γ δ β η ϖ ε ε
ε ρε ν ν
−
=
−
= + + + + + +
= +
∑ ?
?
 (8) 
 
where ity  captures the youth employment rate for CCAA and period;  the KI for 
CCAA and period; and 
itKI
itX  a set of explanatory variables common to the three 
estimated models: Ocup (total number of employed persons in the region); Temp 
(temporality ratio in the region); Asalar_no (percentage of wage earners with no 
qualifications in the region); Inmig (percentage of immigrants in the region).  We also 
have to clarify the following points: i) the fixed effects of a CCAA are controlled in all 
cases8; ii) the econometric adjustments are made from the series of quarterly data which 
                                                 
8 As it has been pointed out by previous works (see, for example, González Güemes et al., (2003)), 
estimates of the minimum wage effects on youth employment rate which do not control for the CCAA 
fixed effect yield non-biased results.  
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includes the period 2000QI-2008QI9; iii) the functional form adopted for the estimation 
is logarithmic and, as result, the estimated KI coefficient should be interpreted as the 
employment elasticity of the examined collective in relation to the variations of that 
index.  
 
 
4. Data and Descriptive analysis. 
 
 In this section we describe the evolution of the KI and the youth employment 
rate using the available information. We also offer initial evidence of the existence of 
regional differences in the evolution of these variables. The data used in our analysis 
have been collected from different statistical sources. More specifically, the data for the 
employment rate, as well as all the information used in the explanatory variable vector 
itX  has been taken from the Spanish Labour Force Survey (EPA). The data about 
minimum wage have been collected from the statistics of the Labour and Immigration 
Ministry10, while the data for average wages proceeds from the Quarterly Survey of 
Labour Costs (period 2000-2008) and the Industry and Services Wage Survey (1981-
1999), taking as the value for the average wage the value corresponding to the ordinary 
wage cost. Table 1 shows information about the evolution of the Inter-professional 
Minimum Wage (SMI) in Spain between 1999 and today, including relevant legislation 
and the successively established minimum wage levels. Up to the year 1997, the 
available data only provided information about whether workers were under 18 years of 
age, 18 years old, or above this age. This is not longer the case with the more recent and 
current set of data. In the table below, we also show the percentage of nominal increases 
established by legal dispositions in relation to previous minimum wage levels. These 
increases were particularly significant in some specific years (1990, 1996, 1997), 
usually after a period of price increases. For the last three year, the real increases have 
been above the historic increases11.  
                                                 
9 The use of quarterly data offers an additional advantage: it allows to capture the short-term fluctuations 
of labour demand. 
10 http://www.mtin.es/estadisticas/bel/IC/index.htm 
11 The Labour and Immigration Ministry’s Labour Guide is published annually and provides detailed 
information about the general and particular application of SMI. 
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Table 1: Minimum Inter-professional Wage (SIM) evolution by age, amount, and period: 1990-2008* 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Under 18 years of a  ge
der
on                
                    
Euros per day 6,6 7 7,4 7,8 8 8,3 10,1 11,8 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..    
Euros per month 198,3 211,3 223,4 232,4 240,5 249 301,8 355,4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..    
Increase 15,2 6,5 5,7 4 3,5 3,5 21,2 17,7 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..    
18 years of age and ol                      
Euros per day 10 10,7 11,3 11,7 12,1 12,6 13 13,4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..    
Euros per month 300,6 320 338,2 351,8 364 376,8 390,2 400,4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..    
Increase 7,1 6,5 5,7 4 3,5 3,5 3,5 2,6 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..    
No age distincti       
Euros per day .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 13,6 13,9 14,2 14,4 14,7 15 15,4 17,1 18 19,0 20,0 20,8 
Euros per month .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 408,9 416,3 424,8 433,4 442,2 451,2 460,5 513 540,9 570,6 600,0 624,0 
Increase .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2,1 1,8 2 2 2 2 2 .. 5,4 5,4 5,1 4,0 
Source: Spanish Labour and Social Affairs Ministry 
 
 
*Legislation:  
 
1990: R.D. 170/1990  
1991: R.D. 8/1991  
1992: R.D. 3/1991 
1993: R.D. 44/1993  
1994: R.D. 2318/1993  
1995: R.D. 2458/1994  
1996: R.D. 2199/1995  
1997: R.D. 2656/1996 
 
1998: R.D. 2015/1997  
1999: R.D. 2817/1998  
2000: R.D. 2065/1999  
2001: R.D. 3476/2000  
2002: R.D. 1466/2001 
 
2003: R.D. 1426/2002  
2004: R.D. 1793/2003  
2005: D.L.. 3/2004 
2005. R.D.2388/2004  
2006: R.D. 1613/2005  
2007  R.D. 1632/2006
2008  RD 1763/2007 
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Graph 1 shows the evolution of the minimum and the average wage in real terms for the 
period 1980-2008. Here it is important to note the fall of both minimum and average 
wages in real terms during the period 1998-2004. 
 
Graph 1: Minimum and Average wage (real terms). Period 1980-2008 
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As it can observed in the data of Table 2, there was a general expansion of employment 
during this period. From 2004-2005, however, there are changes in the evolution of 
these variables: while Minimum Inter-professional Wage (SMI) increased in real terms, 
the youth employment rate growth experienced a slowdown. 
 
Table 2: Youth employment rates in Spain (1996-2008) 
1. OVERALL EMPLOYMENT RATE 1996 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 T2 
 
49,0 
 
 
 
62,0 
 
64,3 
 
65,7 
 
66,6 
 
2. INDEX OF EMPLOYMENT RATE 
EVOLUTION FOR THE 
FOLLOWING COLLECTIVES: 
 
 
 2001-04    2005-08 
Youth 16-19  
Youth 20-24 
Youth 16-24 
Group 25-29 
Group 30-34 
Group 35-39 
Group 40-44 
Group 45-49 
Gruop 50-54 
 95 
105 
104 
104 
104 
103 
103 
105 
106 
   94 
101 
99 
102 
103 
103 
102 
105 
105 
Source: INE, EPA (Population aged between 16-64 years) 
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 From the data about minimum and average wages, we proceed to estimate the 
Kaitz Index. The graphs of Block 1 (see Appendix) show the KI evolution by sector and 
CCAA for the period 2000-2008. In general terms, we observe a slightly growing trend 
in the evolution of KI for most regions, which indicates that the minimum and the 
average wages are drawing closer in the CCAA. Furthermore, the graphs also reveal the 
existence of regional differences in relation to the value of the index. The lower values 
for the index (below 35%) are found in regions like Catalonia, Madrid, Navarra and 
Basque Country, while the higher values are registered in Murcia, Galicia and 
Extremadura (around 45% in this last region). The existence of these differences is 
particularly relevant for our conclusions: if there is any significant effect (either positive 
or negative) of minimum wage on youth employment, this is expected to be larger in the 
regions with a higher KI value. 
 
 According to economic sectors, these differences become quite significant as we 
find different behaviour patterns. In a several CCAA the KI for some industries is 
clearly below the total KI: this is case in Aragon, Asturias, Cantabria, Canary Islands, 
Castilla y León, Catalonia, Galicia, Madrid, Navarra and Basque Country. However. 
there are no significant differences between both indexes in regions like, for example, 
Andalusia, Balearic Islands, Castilla la Mancha, Valencian Community, Extremadura 
and Murcia. In other regions, by contrast, it is remarkable that the KI for the 
construction sector is above the total KI. This is the case of Balearic Islands, Canary 
Islands, Castilla la Mancha, Castilla y León, Valencian Community, Catalonia, 
Extremadura, Galicia, Murcia and Madrid. Finally, the KI in the services sector is 
relatively similar to the total KI in all regions with the exception of Asturias.  
 
 Furthermore, the graphs from Block II (see Appendix) provide a first 
approximation about the relationship between KI values and youth employment rate 
figures. In general terms, the starting point is a youth employment rate located between 
the 15% and 20% with a slightly growing tendency over time in most regions. Asturias 
and the Basque Country can be singled out for their relatively low youth employment 
rates (around 10%), while other CCAA like Castilla la Mancha, Valencian Community 
and Murcia show relatively higher values (around 25%). Another significant aspect of 
youth employment is its marked seasonality. In most regions, youth employment rates, 
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as can be clearly observed, tend to reach their highest levels in the third quarter of the 
year.  
 
 From the previous descriptive analysis, it is difficult to derive any clear pattern 
relating the KI values to youth employment rates. On the one hand, we find some 
regions where the values for youth employment rates are –with some differences 
between them- relatively closer to the KI values like, for example, in the case of the 
Balearic Islands, Catalonia, Valencian Community, Madrid and Navarra. On the other 
hand, we also have the case of Catalonia which has a KI of 30-35% over time and a 
youth employment rate close to the 25%. While Madrid has a similar KI value as 
Catalonia, the youth employment rates in this region have experienced a substantial 
growth over the period under study as they have doubled and reached 20% at the end of 
it. The case of the Balearic Islands is noteworthy for the volatility of youth employment 
rates, characterised by a marked seasonality. A similar phenomenon can be observed in 
Navarra, although in this region the employment rates are on average lower than in the 
Balearic islands, as it is the case with its KI value. Finally, there are regions like 
Asturias, Canary islands, Cantabria, Extremadura, Galicia and Castilla y León which 
show larger differences between KI values and youth employment rates.  
 
 
5. Results. 
 
 In this section we report the main results of the estimates obtained from the 
econometric models introduced in Section 3. Table 3 shows the results for the models of 
Block A, when the KI definition does not take in to account sectoral differences 
(equation (1)) 
 
 As we have previously indicated, it is particularly relevant to introduce lags for a 
correct analysis of the effect of minimum wage over youth employment. When such 
lags are not introduced, we find a positive and significant effect of the index over the 
youth employment rate. However, if we introduce four lags for each quarter of the year, 
the effect becomes negative but not significant. More specifically, we find positive and 
significant effects in the first, second and fourth lags, and a negative and significant 
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effect in the third lag. Finally, when we include quarterly dicothomic variables, we 
observe a positive and significant effect only in the first lag. To this we have to add the 
positive and particularly significant effect of the third quarter dummy on youth 
employment rate, which serves to demonstrate the high degree of seasonality of 
employment among this particular collective.  
 
 
Table 3: Block A Econometric Models (Kaitz Index, equation(1)) 
 Basic With KI lags With KI lags and 
quarterly dummies 
          Coef t Coef t Coef t 
       LogIK 1,065 4,00 -0,551 -1,28 0,447 0,96 
LogIK_1   1,810 3,68 1,443 2,51 
LogIK_2   2,600 5,16 0,466 0,80 
LogIK_3   -2,793 -5,56 -0,507 -0,88 
LogIK_4   0,823 1,88 0,392 0,87 
        Ocup 0,495 3,49 0,271 1,70 0,094 0,64 
        Temp 0,285 2,33 0,256 2,05 0,322 2,81 
 Asalar_noc 0,196 2,14 0,259 2,65 0,215 2,40 
  Inmig -0,009 -0,61 -0,023 -1,37 -0,018 -1,14 
       
2nd Quarter     0,041 1,53 
3rd Quarter     0,210 9,16 
4th Quarter     0,037 1,33 
    Constant -5,788 -5,53 -7,321 -6,40 -7,597 -7,22 
        
ση   0,497  0,390  0,379  
     σε 0,182  0,171  0,156  
 
Table 4: Block B Econometric Models (Kaitz Index, equation(1)) 
 Basic With KI lags With KI lags and 
quarterly dummies 
   Coef t Coef t Coef t 
       LogIK 1,099 3,26 -0,313 -0,70 0,462 1,01 
LogIK_1   1,396 3,24 1,108 2,36 
LogIK_2   2,788 6,21 0,706 1,45 
LogIK_3   -2,752 -6,39 -0,638 -1,37 
LogIK_4   0,497 1,14 0,312 0,73 
        Ocup 0,720 3,66 0,476 2,11 0,243 1,13 
        Temp 0,275 2,00 0,118 0,84 0,217 1,69 
 Asalar_noc 0,230 2,04 0,392 3,24 0,324 2,91 
  Inmig -0,056 -2,60 -0,036 -1,49 -0,014 -0,62 
       
2nd Quarter     0,046 2,14 
3rd Quarter     0,206 9,76 
4th Quarter     0,040 1,75 
    Constant -7,380 -8,09 -7,574 -7,24 -7,492 -8,07 
       
ρ 0,345  0,329  0,366  
     ση 0,676  0,491  0,381  
     σε 0,172  0,165  0,147  
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In Table 4, we show the estimates for the models of Block B. As it can be 
observed, the results are quite similar to those obtained in Block A: positive and 
significant KI effects in the Basic Model; positive and significant effects in the first and 
second lags and negative in the third when we include the variable with four quarterly 
lags; and positive and significant effect only in the first lag when we also incorporate 
the quarterly dicothomic variable estimates.  
 
 In Tables 5 and 6 we provide the estimates for Blocks A and B, respectively, but 
this time taking into account the definition of KI introduced in equation (2). In this set 
of estimates, it is significant to note that both the static and dynamic models show a 
positive and significant effect in the current value of the index on youth employment 
rate when we include index lags and quarterly dicothomic variables. 
 
 We do not observe, however, any significant effect in the index lags. It is worth 
noting again that the positive and significant value taken by the dicothomic variable 
quotient on the third quarter indicates the extent to which job opportunities for young 
people tend to be primarily concentrated on seasonal employment, closely linked to the 
services sector. 
 
Table 5: Block A Econometric Models (Kaitz Index, equation(2)) 
 Basic UIT KI lags With KI lags and 
quarterly dummies 
   Coef t Coef t Coef t 
       LogIK 0,173 2,55 0,000 0,00 0,358 3,13 
LogIK_1     0,038 0,27 -0,056 -0,39 
LogIK_2     0,671 4,89 0,012 0,08 
LogIK_3     -0,398 -2,94 0,074 0,52 
LogIK_4     -0,078 -0,75 0,011 0,10 
        Ocup 0,433 2,45 0,299 1,40 -0,081 -0,41 
        Temp 0,281 2,27 0,282 2,14 0,298 2,50 
 Asalar_noc 0,185 1,98 0,164 1,60 0,184 1,99 
  Inmig -0,022 -1,36 -0,034 -1,87 -0,037 -2,26 
             
2nd Quarter         0,071 2,91 
3rd Quarter         0,245 9,61 
4th Quarter         0,046 1,86 
    Constant -2,063 -1,93 -1,304 -1,05 0,460 0,40 
             
ση   0,464   0,381   0,337   
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     σε 0,184   0,179   0,161   
 
 
 
 
Table 6:Block B Econometric Models (Kaitz Index, equation(2)) 
 Basic With KI lags With Ki lags and quarterly 
dummies 
          Coef t Coef t Coef t 
       LogIK 0,038 0,45 -0,004 -0,04 0,292 2,66 
LogIK_1     -0,016 -0,14 -0,073 -0,64 
LogIK_2     0,661 5,71 0,022 0,19 
LogIK_3     -0,407 -3,66 0,015 0,14 
LogIK_4     -0,215 -2,15 -0,051 -0,51 
        Ocup 0,952 4,1 0,876 2,98 0,424 1,51 
        Temp 0,260 1,85 0,168 1,14 0,175 1,34 
 Asalar_noc 0,190 1,63 0,246 1,93 0,310 2,67 
  Inmig -0,058 -2,49 -0,025 -0,93 -0,016 -0,64 
             
2nd Quarter         0,064 3,24 
3rd Quarter         0,233 9,96 
4th Quarter         0,042 2,06 
    Constant -4,914 -5,5 -4,264 -3,91 -2,191 -2,32 
             
Ρ 0,362   0,355   0,413   
     ση 0,884   0,819   0,453   
     σε 0,173   0,171   0,150   
 
In sum, we can conclude that, according to these results, there is no evidence of any 
negative effect of minimum wage on youth employment for the period 2000-2008. 
There are, however, some indications of a slightly positive or neutral effect, a result 
which is consistent with other research on the subject (Card, 1995; Manning and 
Machin, 1996; Dickens et al., 1998, 1999; Bhaskar, 1999; Lang and Kahn, 1999). 
 
 In the light of these results, we can ask ourselves if it is a valid hypothesis to 
assume that, in the case of young people, we are dealing with a monopsonistic type of 
labour market12. Although the greater or lesser degree of realisms of our assumptions is 
not the best methodological criteria for the selection and assessment of any model or 
theory, such monopsony power does not appear to be the prevailing factor due to the 
high level of atomisation and dispersion in labour demand that currently exists in Spain. 
Even so, it can always be counter-argued that the source of power for the employers 
primarily derives from the intrinsic limitations experienced by workers when choosing a 
                                                 
12 See section 3 above where we indicate that for a monopsonist the increase of youth (minimum) wages 
tends to be accompanied by employment growth as the average cost for the employer is below the 
marginal cost. For an explanation of monopsony on the labour market see Elliot, 1991. 
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job and that, in the particular case of young workers, their lower level of qualification as 
well as their lack of working experience constitute an important obstacle in the search 
for employment.  
 
 This will imply that young people are more inclined to accept any wage level 
offered to them (“wage-conformist”) than the rest of the workers. Such affirmation 
could, in theory, be extended to other groups of workers, including those which belong 
to so called “outsider” collectives when having to negotiate collective bargain 
agreements. Furthermore, the existence of a dual labour market in Spain, closely linked 
to the type of labour regulation and the existing collective bargain structure, results in a 
sharp division between permanent and temporal workers, a relatively unbalanced 
situation when compared to other core European countries. For this reason, the co-
existence of increases on both minimum wage and youth employment during this period 
can be deemed to be compatible with a competitive model characterised by a dynamic 
behaviour and structural change in labour demand, which also registers increases of its 
elasticity in relation to low-level wages. That is to say, a model where the institutional 
aspects (trade-union power and regulations) works as effective mechanisms to prevent 
an “emptying” of the labour marker, a situation towards which the free and unrestrained 
interplay of offer and supply might eventually lead to13. 
 
 In fact, there are a series of reasons which help us to explain both the absence of 
any negative impact on youth employment and the lack of any increase in the youth 
unemployment rate during the period under study. In the first place, the Spanish 
economy has experienced during this period a rapid economic growth –the average 
growth of the GDP has fluctuated between the 3 and 4 %, well above the average for the 
EU15- which has resulted in continuous shifts in labour demand to respond to new 
requirements in the productive and service sectors.  
 
 At the same time, there has been a significant increase in labour supply as a 
result of the large and steady inflow of immigrants (with high labour participation rates) 
as well as the continuous growth of women’s activity rate among the native population. 
                                                 
13 This last statement leads to the examination of the causes for this situation and to express certain 
reservations about the efficiency and “Paretian” symmetry degree of the current labour regulation 
mechanisms and labour relations prevailing in Spain. 
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Recent social changes in the country and the modification of labour legislation for better 
compatibility between family and labour life have both played an important role in the 
latter case.  
 
 These two developments have been the driving force behind the significant 
employment growth experienced during the period which has affected to all different 
working-age groups. All of them, including young people, have experienced several 
points increases in their respective employment rates. What this means, in theoretical 
terms, is that the market balance wage has reached a new threshold as a result of the 
steady increase of the demand (more specifically, by the shift of the demand function) 
and of its elasticity. 
 
 The availability of an almost unlimited labour offer has eliminated most of the 
previous labour force restrictions which slowed down the production growth, especially 
in the construction and service sectors. Several sectors have experienced significant 
structural changes both in terms of an intensified use of the labour factor per production 
unit and of important changes in the occupational structure. As a result of these 
changes, the number of low-qualifications or skilled jobs have doubled during the 
period under study. In addition to this, we also have to include the reinforcement of the 
elasticity of wage labour demand in relation to the GDP. 
 
 Despite the increase of labour demand, but also as result of the expansion of 
labour offer, the average behaviour of wages – and of minimum wage - has registered a 
slight fall in real terms. Such fall has not been the result of any wage reduction in high 
or medium qualification occupations, but rather of the fall of the wages of an important 
percentage of new workers employed in low-qualifications jobs. That is to say, this fall 
in wages is, in short, due to the increasing degree of wage dispersion.  
 
 
6. The Minimum Inter-professional Wage (SMI) in the new economic 
context. 
 
 Table 7 shows a series of different scenarios (proposed, respectively, by the 
trade unions and the Spanish government) including deadlines, new expected wage 
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levels as well as percentage increases in monetary terms that such proposed scenarios 
will imply in the near future. 
 
 In the case of Scenario A (government proposal) the minimum wage increase for 
the period 2009-2012 is an accumulated 33.33% (an average simple annual increase of 
8%) Under the Scenario B, this increase is close to 66.66% for the same period with an 
annual rate of 16.66%. This larger increase of 66.6% is also considered in the case of 
Scenario C (proposed by Socialist Party), but it is extended to the period 2009-2016, 
with a simple average increase of 8.33%. Finally, if the objectives of the European 
Social Chart are to be met as in the proposed Scenario D, the minimum wage increase 
will amount to 85.18%. While in this proposal there is no reference to any specific time 
period, if we presume this to be identical to previous scenarios, this will represent a 
10.64% increase of minimum wage. In all these cases, the increases will be above the 
expected accumulated inflation of the reference period, which will imply a significant 
increase of the Minimum Inter-professional Wage (SMI) in real terms.  
 
Table 7: Economic and labour market evolution. Future SMI scenarios 
EVOLUTION AND SCENARIOS EVOLUTION (INDEX) OR CURRENT VALUE MONTHLY 
FIGURE 
1. GDP Evolution, Active, Employed, and Unemployed 
Population: 1996-2007 
• GDP (real)  
• Active population 
• Employed population 
• Unemployed population 
• Activity rate 
• Employment rate 
• Unemployment rate 
 
150,5 
128,3 
158,0 
50,3 
115,2 
135,9 
37,6 
 
2. Wage evolution and SMI values 
A) Wage evolution 
• Real average wage:1998-2004 
• Real SMI:1998-2004 
• Nominal SMI in 1998 
• Nominal SMI in 2004 
• Nominal SMI evolution 1998-2004 
B) Wage evolution 
• Real average wage: 2005-2007 
• Real SMI: 2005-2008 
• Nominal SMI in 2005 
• Nominal SMI in 2008 
• Nominal SMI evolution SMI 2005-2008 
 
92,8 
96,9 
408,9 
460,5 
112,6 
 
 
101,8 
106,0 
513,0 
              600,0 
117,0 
 
3. SMI proposed scenarios (in current  €) :   
• Government’s scenario A (2009-12) 133,33 % 800 € 
• Trade Unions’ scenario B (2009-12) 166,66 % 1.000 € 
• PSOE’s scenario C (2009-16) 166,66 % 1.000 € 
• European Social Chart’s scenario D (no dates) 185,18 % (*) 1.111,1 € 
(*) Percentage equivalent to 60% of EU net medium wage.
Source: Own elaboration from the available data in the report: “Efectos en el empleo de las subidas del Salario Mínimo 
Interprofesional en España y en la Comunidad de Madrid” (Consejería de Empleo y Mujer, Comunidad de Madrid). 
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 Regarding these different proposals, the first consideration that has to be made is 
that their attainment will take place on a period of economic slow down which, among 
other things, will result in a severe adjustment of the labour market in depth and over 
time. This recent, dramatic change in the economic activity trend implies a substantial 
modification of the framework where we can place the potential effect of wages on 
labour demand. In this context, it will be difficult to expect that any cost increase in the 
labour factor would remain neutral: in the following years, we are likely to see a 
drawback in labour demand, a lost in the elasticity of low-wage sections, as well as 
changes in the labour time organization.  
 
 For all these reasons, the minimum wage policies should be administered with 
great caution. In the light of the current literature about theoretical predictions and the 
accumulated empirical evidence for industrialised countries, including this present work 
in the case of Spain, we can tentatively elaborate the following list of the possible 
consequences of these developments:  
 
i ) Negative effects on employment with an accumulative character and distributed over 
time due to the existence of lags. This will imply a gradual reduction in the overall 
employment rate, especially among those workers who are more exposed to become 
redundant in such circumstances like, for example, young people, women, disabled 
persons, low-skilled persons and, in general, all low-pay workers.  
 
ii) An eventual expansion of part-time, rather than full-time, employment as part of 
employers’ strategy to make working time more flexible, reduce labour costs, and 
increase productivity. 
 
iii) An increase of the unemployment rate, longer unemployment periods, and the rise of 
long-term unemployment. 
 
iv) A displacement from the labour market of those collectives whose new wages 
appear now to be closer to the average market wage and replacement by other worker 
with wages above average but with a reduced wage cost for employers. 
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v) An early exit from the education system with an increase in labour participation rate. 
In the medium term, participation rates fall gradually due to the disincentive effect as 
these high school dropt-outs have little job opportunities and tend to reduce the number 
of worked hours (part-time employment) 
 
vi) A reduction in the intensive use of labour force in activities or occupational groups 
characterised by low skilled tasks, just the opposite phenomenon to what have happened 
few years ago. 
 
vii) Substantial increases of irregular employment, especially among immigrants, as 
they belong to a large employment supply group for low-skilled jobs and are 
particularly exposed to the black economy. This phenomenon is likely to be more 
marked at regional level, wherever the gap between the minimum and average wages 
becomes closer. 
 
 
7. Conclusions. 
 
This work has examined the impact of minimum wage on youth employment in Spain 
using the available data for the period 2000-2008. For this purpose, we have developed 
an analytical framework capable of taking into account regional differences, the 
existence of lag effects, and the seasonal character of youth employment.  
 
In order to capture the effects which various un-observed labour supply and 
demand factors may have on the youth employment rate, we have followed the existing 
literature on the subject and decided to use in our analysis the Kaitz Index defined here 
as the quotient of the minimum wage per worked hour for full-time workers of a 
particular region and the average wage per worked hour. Furthermore, we have also 
proposed a alternative definition of the Kaitz Index to deal with the possibility of 
finding important wage variations between different sectors. 
 
 The results obtained show, first of all, that the introduction or increase of the 
minimum wage may have lagged effects on employment. Although it appears that the 
minimum wage has, in fact, a positive and significant effect on youth employment, this 
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effect is no longer clear once we include in our estimates the KI quarterly lags. More 
specifically, there are positive and significant effects in the first and second lags, but a 
negative and significant effect on the third lag.  
 
 Furthermore, youth employment in Spain has a marked seasonal character. For 
this reason, it is particularly relevant to take this feature into account when analysing the 
impact of minimum wage on youth employment. Once we take into account the 
seasonality of employment, the negative impact observed in the KI third lag becomes, 
accordingly, no-significant  
 
 In conclusion, then, if we consider existing regional differences, the lags and the 
seasonal work variations, there is no definitive evidence of any negative effects of 
minimum wage on youth employment in Spain in the period under study. While this 
result can be interpreted as evidence of the existence of a monopsonistic labour market, 
it can also be compatible with a perfect competitive structure where a certain dynamic 
factor and a structural change in labour demand coexist together.  
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Block I: Evolution of the KI by sector of activity and region 
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La Rioja
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Block II: Evolution of the KI and the youth employment rates.  
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Balearic Islands
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Castilla y Leon
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Valencian Community
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Galicia
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Basque Country
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